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Nayha Acharya* 
ABSTRACT 
Canadian courts use simple probability reasoning inconsistently in personal 
injury litigation, subjecting litigants to irregular legal principles and potentially 
improper compensation. Turning to foundational principles of tort litigation, 
I suggest a new framework for the availability of simple probability that 
would promote greater coherence. Simple probability reasoning is under-
stood as an alternative standard of proof that enables compensation for a loss 
proportional to the likelihood that the loss will occur. Accordingly, the avail-
ability of simple probability is thought to depend on which types of facts 
(past vs. future vs. hypothetical facts) are amenable to balance of probabilities 
proof versus simple probability. This is the ‘type of fact’ framework, but it is 
not applied consistently. Part 1 argues that the inconsistency is rooted in the 
mischaracterization of simple probability reasoning as a standard of proof. It 
is better conceived of as a method of enabling chances, in their own right, to 
become legally relevant facts. Understood this way, simple probability is 
available only where chances are relevant to the legal determination at stake. I 
apply this characterization in Part 2, concluding that while simple probability 
reasoning is irrelevant to liability determinations, it is crucial in appropriately 
assessing damages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Canadian judges and scholars have mischaracterized the principle of ‘simple proba-
bility reasoning,’ resulting in irregular use of the doctrine, potentially improper 
compensation for injured plaintiffs, and erroneous liability for defendants. In this paper, 
I endeavour to provide the correct interpretation of simple probability by reverting to 
the fundamental principles of liability and compensation for negligently inflicted injury. 
This analysis results in a new framework for determining where simple probability rea-
soning should be available. Applying this framework results in a more coherent 
approach to using simple probability, which I hope will contribute to ensuring fair and 
consistent injury litigation. 
Simple probability reasoning is conventionally understood as an alternative stand-
ard of proof. If the standard is met, then the fact in question is treated as true for the 
purpose of the legal determination; if not, then the alleged fact is treated as untrue.1 
Simple probability reasoning is usually characterized as an alternative to the convention-
al approach to fact-finding. It allows for compensation for a loss proportional to the 
chance that the loss will occur. For instance, if a plaintiff can show that because of his 
injuries, there is a 30% likelihood of requiring a surgery in the future, then he will be 
compensated for 30% of the total losses associated with the surgery; if there is a 70% 
chance of surgery, then he will be compensated for 70% of the total assessed value, and 
so on. The supposed availability of these two approaches—the balance of probabili-
ties/all-or-nothing approach and the simple probability approach—gives rise to the 
question of when one should be used over the other. 
Two interrelated problems suggest the need for a new approach to simple probabil-
ity in personal injury litigation. Firstly, Canadian courts apply the prevailing approach, 
which I call the ‘type of fact’ approach, inconsistently. Currently, courts categorize facts 
as past, hypothetical, or future, and the availability of simple probability depends on 
which of these types of facts is thought to trigger its use. The problem, as I will demon-
strate, is that when it comes to assessing damages entitlements, courts are inconsistent 
in applying this categorization and are therefore inconsistent in their use of simple 
probability. Outside the damages context, courts have displayed a less wavering mettle. 
The judiciary’s unwillingness to apply simple probability when making liability determi-
nations has been met with academic criticism, particularly in cases of medical injury. 
This suggests dissatisfaction with the limits placed on the availability of simple probabil-
ity reasoning. 
This indeterminacy must be remedied because the fairness of the adjudicative sys-
tem depends on consistent application of legal principles. Otherwise, similarly situated 
litigants may be subjected to different principles without justification. Moreover, the 
lack of predictability in the application of legal principles can lead to significant disparity 
in monetary awards, making settlement more difficult and perhaps less likely. 
The second problem is that none of the frameworks that arise out of the ‘type of 
fact’ approach can be applied consistently without compromising the fundamental prin-
ciples of liability determination or damages assessment. This suggests that the 
inconsistency in the current approach is not merely the product of superficial confusion 
                                                                                                                                            
1 In this paper, “facts” denotes factual elements that must be proven, not that are proven. 
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over where to apply simple probability reasoning, but is grounded in something more 
fundamental.  
In Part 1, I diagnose the root of the problem: the conventional ‘type of fact’  
approach is based on a mischaracterization of simple probability reasoning. The charac-
terization of simple probability as an alternative method of proving facts is, I argue, 
inaccurate, and has led to the incoherence surrounding its application. Simple probabil-
ity is better described as a method of placing value on a chance, when that chance is 
first established as a legal fact. This re-characterization reframes the determination of 
where simple probability should be available. Its availability should not depend on 
whether the fact is past, future or hypothetical. When simple probability is understood 
as a quantification mechanism for chance, the question of its availability should be 
whether the demands of liability determinations and of damages assessments require that 
chance be established as a relevant legal fact. The foundational analysis in Part 1 ex-
plains the necessity of a new approach to the question of where to use simple 
probability reasoning, which will promote greater coherence in its application. Then, in 
Parts 2 and 3, I apply my proposed approach to demonstrate how simple probability 
should be used in injury litigation. 
Characterizing simple probability as a chance-quantification tool, my focus shifts in 
Parts 2 and 3 to whether chances should be relevant for liability determinations and 
damages assessments. I revert to the foundational principles of liability and damages 
determinations throughout my analyses. In Part 2, I present the reasons why chances are 
not, and should not be, relevant facts for determining liability. Thus, simple probability 
should be unavailable in that context. Conversely, the significance of chance and the 
consequent role of simple probability in determining compensatory entitlements are 
demonstrated in Part 3. 
PART 1: RE-CHARACTERIZING SIMPLE PROBABILITY REASONING 
Simple Probability Reasoning and its Associated Confusions 
One of the earliest articulations of the simple probability principle appears in a 
House of Lords decision, Mallett v McMonagle. This case has been cited by a significant 
number of Canadian trial and appellate decisions,2 and was quoted with approval and 
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Janiak v Ippolito3 and in Athey v Leonati:4 
In assessing damages which depend on [the court’s] view as to what will 
happen in the future or would have happened in the future if something had 
not happened in the past, the court must make an estimate as to what are the 
chances that a particular thing will or would have happened and reflect those 
                                                                                                                                            
2 At the time of publication, an unrefined Quicklaw search suggests that at least 168 Canadian cases of all 
levels of court have referred to Mallett v McMonagle, [1970] AC 166 HL (Eng) [Mallett]. 
3 Janiak v Ippolito, [1985] 1 SCR 146 at para 42, 16 DLR (4th) 1. 
4 Athey v Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458 at paras 28-29, 140 DLR (4th) 235 [Athey]. 
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chances, whether they are more or less than even, in the amount of damages 
which it awards.5  
Lord Reid’s comments contain the principle behind simple probability and how it is 
put into practice: the court must consider the chance of a future event whether or not 
the value of the chance is less than 50%. Once assessed, it is reflected in the damages 
awarded. For instance, if a plaintiff is able to establish a 30% chance of requiring a 
compensable future medical treatment, then 30% of the total assessed cost of that med-
ical treatment will be awarded.  
Simple probability has been applied in a number of Canadian appellate personal in-
jury decisions. For instance, in Conklin v Smith,6 the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff 
lost earnings based on the chance that he would have succeeded in securing a more 
lucrative pilot’s career. In Kovats v Ogilvie7, the British Columbia Court of Appeal com-
pensated for the chance of developing post-degenerative arthritis as a future 
consequence of the injury, rather than requiring proof on a balance of probabilities that 
the arthritic condition would occur in the future. In Schrump v Koot,8 the Ontario Court 
of Appeal opined that the chance of the future surgery is compensable, even if its future 
occurrence cannot be established on the balance of probabilities. The same court clari-
fied in Graham v Rourke9 that simple probability is not only available for the plaintiff’s 
benefit. The loss of income award in that case was reduced by 25% based on a 25% 
chance that the plaintiff would have been unable to earn as much as anticipated, even 
had she not suffered the accident. Similarly, the cost of care award was reduced by 15% 
because of a 15% chance that the medical services would have been required even with-
out the accident.10  
In Athey v Leonati, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that simple probability 
reasoning is available for hypothetical and future events:  
Hypothetical events (such as how the plaintiff’s life would have proceeded 
without the tortious injury) or future events need not be proven on a balance 
of probabilities. Instead, they are simply given weight according to their rela-
tive likelihood. For example, if there is a 30 percent chance that the plaintiff’s 
injuries will worsen, then the damage award may be increased by 30 percent 
of the anticipated extra damages to reflect that risk. A future or hypothetical 
possibility will be taken into consideration as long as it is a real and substan-
tial possibility and not mere speculation…By contrast, past events must be 
proven, and once proven they are treated as certainties.11 
Although judicial authorities endorse simple probability reasoning, Canadian courts 
have faced challenges in applying it. To determine when simple probability should be 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Mallett, supra note 2 at 191. This House of Lords decision involved a future dependency claim of a young 
widow whose husband died in an accident. The Court’s task in assessing the dependency claim was to estimate 
“how long the dependents would have continued to benefit from the dependency had the deceased not been 
killed and what the amount of the dependency would have been in each year of that period” (at 190).  
6 Conklin v Smith, [1978] 2 SCR 1107, 88 DLR (3d) 317. 
7 Kovats v Ogilvie, [1971] 1 WWR 561 at 15, [1970] BCJ No 653 (QL) (BCCA) [Kovats]. 
8 Schrump v Koot (1978), 18 OR (2d) 337, 82 DLR (3d) 553 (Ont CA) [Schrump]. 
9 Graham v Rourke (1990), 75 OR (2d) 622, 74 DLR (4th) 1 (Ont CA).  
10 Ibid at para 64. 
11 Athey, supra note 4 at paras 26-28 (references removed). 
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used, courts have resorted to a three-part classification of facts as past, future, and hy-
pothetical. Problematically, courts have not always agreed on which type(s) of facts 
attract simple probability reasoning. While many courts have used the past/future fact 
divide to determine when simply probability applies, some courts have held that the 
balance of probabilities standard is applicable to past as well as future facts.12 For in-
stance, the Alberta Court of Appeal has held:  
With respect to past and future earnings, much the same comments apply. The 
cross-appellant plaintiff advances questions of weight, and guessing about 
what would have occurred without an accident. He had no proven steady 
employment track record before the accident. There is no way to assess these 
heads of damages with certainty. In a civil case, a balance of probabilities suffices.13  
The Ontario Court of Appeal endorsed a similar view in Lurtz v Duchesne.14 At trial, 
the court found that medical providers misdiagnosed the plaintiff, and were liable for 
her resulting injury. The quantification of the damages award was at issue on appeal. 
The Court of Appeal approved the trial judge’s comments:  
I find that [the plaintiff] is entitled to future loss of income. On the balance 
of probabilities, I find that Donna is unlikely to return to remunerative em-
ployment at any time in the future.15 
[…] 
I find that considering the expert evidence of Dr. Benoit and Dr. Singer on 
the presence and the lasting stay and effect of the disease, Donna Lurtz is a 
disabled person and will not, on a balance of probabilities, return to work in 
the future.16 
Along with confusion over the applicability of simple probability to future facts, 
the comment in Athey that simple probability can apply to hypothetical facts has also 
been interpreted inconsistently. Some appellate cases, like Courtney v Cleary17 and Gill v 
Probert,18 have concluded that past hypothetical facts warrant the use of simple probabil-
ity reasoning. Courtney v Cleary centred on a misdiagnosis of mouth cancer, leading to 
extensive medical intervention and injurious disfigurement to the plaintiff’s face. The 
                                                                                                                                            
12 I do not intend to overstate this inconsistency. Canadian courts are fairly stable in refusing to apply the 
balance of probabilities standard to future injuries, usually citing the authorities noted in Section 2(a) above. 
For a sampling of such decisions, see Steenblok v Funk, (1990) 46 BCLR (2d) 133, [1990] 5 WWR 365, (BCCA), 
(often cited for this principle in British Columbia), Nelson v Nelson, [1992] BCJ No 1576 (QL), Basque v Saint 
John (City), 2002 NBQB 131, 250 NBR (2d) 207. 
13 Dubitski v Barbieri, 2006 ABCA 304 at para 14, 67 Alta LR (4th) 9 [emphasis added]. 
14 Lurtz v Duchesne (2005), 194 OAC 119, 136 ACWS (3d) 1055 (Ont CA). The relevant question on appeal was 
whether “trial judge should have drawn an adverse inference against the respondent in her claim for future 
loss of income because she did not call any of her treating physicians to give viva voce evidence.” According 
to the Court of Appeal, the trial judge committed no error when he found that based on the evidence present-
ed, he was satisfied that the plaintiff has met the burden of proof for the claim for past and future losses. 
15 Lurtz v Duchesne, [2003] OTC 319, 122 ACWS (3d) 384 at para 442. 
16 Ibid at para 455. 
17 Courtney v Cleary, 2010 NLCA 46, 322 DLR (4th) 10 [Courtney]. 
18 Gill v Probert, 2001 BCCA 331, 105 ACWS (3d) 254 [Gill]. 
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defendant physician accepted liability but appealed the quantification of damages re-
garding lost earning capacity. In response, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal was  
…satisfied that the trial judge stated and applied the wrong test (the balance 
of probabilities) in dealing with loss of earning capacity from September 
2001 to trial. Given that the claim centers [sic] on a hypothetical situation she 
should have applied the simple probabilities test and applied the appropriate 
percentage to the per annum loss.19 
In Gill v Probert, the plaintiff suffered a herniated disc in a car accident. The defend-
ant appealed the trial judge’s award for past lost earnings. Relying on the Supreme 
Court’s comments in Athey, the Court of Appeal held:  
In assessing hypothetical events there is no reason to distinguish between 
those before trial and those after trial. In making allowances for contingen-
cies the trial judge was assessing the hypothetical events that could have  
affected the plaintiff’s employment earnings, according to the assessment to 
their relative likelihood.20 
 The Smith v Knudsen21 decision from British Columbia provides another example of 
the confusion about simple probability’s applicability to hypothetical facts. There, the 
plaintiff commenced an action for damages for injuries suffered in a car accident. He 
alleged that his injuries rendered him unable to prepare a bid for a government contract 
to build ambulances. He claimed compensation for this lost opportunity. The trial judge 
cited a number of cases on the standard of proof required to recover for the lost oppor-
tunity to submit the offer. The trial judge noted that the cases were inconsistent: while 
some seemed to suggest a simple probability approach, others suggested that he should 
apply a balance of probabilities standard.22 
The trial judge found that cases with the most precedential value, including Athey, 
held that a balance of probabilities standard is applicable to past losses. Since the plain-
tiff’s claimed lost income would have been earned prior to the trial, the trial judge 
classified his claim as a “past” loss, and imposed the balance of probabilities standard. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff was required to prove that, absent his injuries, he would more 
likely than not have won the contract and, therefore, would have procured the earnings 
he claimed. If the plaintiff could prove this, then he would be entitled to recover all of 
the lost profits associated with the contract. However, the plaintiff was unable to meet 
this burden. 
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial judge “misdirected the jury on the bur-
den of proof required to establish a loss of opportunity to be the successful bidder on a 
contact to build ambulances for the provincial government.”23 The Court of Appeal 
agreed. Applying Athey differently, it held that “the trial judge’s instructions do not 
accord with the case authorities regarding proof of hypothetical events.”24  
                                                                                                                                            
19 Courtney, supra note 17 at para 62. 
20 Gill, supra note 19 at para 9. 
21 Smith v Knudsen, 2004 BCCA 613, 247 DLR (4th) 256 [Smith]. 
22 Ibid at paras 7-9 and 11-15, reproducing para 22 of the trial decision. 
23 Ibid at para 5. 
24 Ibid at para 23. 
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The Court of Appeal held that authorities have drawn a distinction between proof 
of actual events and proof of future or hypothetical events.25 “What would have hap-
pened but for the injury,” the Court opined, “is no more ‘knowable’ than what will 
happen in the future and therefore it is appropriate to assess the likelihood of hypothet-
ical and future events rather than applying the balance of probabilities test that is 
applied with respect to past actual events.”26 The Court of Appeal classified the plain-
tiff’s claim as a hypothetical event, which warranted the use of simple probability. The 
trial judge’s instruction to the jury to apply the balance of probabilities standard was 
overturned. According to the Court of Appeal, the jury should have been instructed to 
determine the likelihood that the plaintiff would have won the contract, and to award 
proportional compensation (i.e. to apply simple probability reasoning).  
The discord between the trial and appellate decisions in Smith v Knudsen, despite cit-
ing many of the same authorities, indicates that the question of where to use simple 
probability reasoning is neither easy nor resolved. The BC Court of Appeal itself has 
expressed two different views on the matter. Interpreting the Supreme Court’s com-
ments in Athey, the court in Sales v Clark held that when “read in context, it is 
clear…that the discussion of ‘hypothetical events’ is limited to what will happen in the 
future or what would have happened in the future if something had not happened in the 
past.”27 Like the trial judge in Smith v Knudsen, the BC Court of Appeal in Sales v Clarke 
maintained the past versus future divide for the availability of simple probability reason-
ing. In contrast, the appeal court’s conclusion in Smith v Knudsen suggests that the 
past/future divide does not account for the availability of simple probability reasoning 
because such reasoning should be available for hypothetical past facts, as well as future 
facts. 
Evidently, some courts have adhered to the past versus future divide, where past 
facts are subject to the balance of probabilities standard, while future facts are subject to 
simple probability. Others attest to a past versus hypothetical and future divide, where 
future facts as well as hypothetical past facts are subject to simple probability. Still oth-
ers have applied the balance of probabilities standard, even in respect of future losses. 
Depending on which approach is preferred, a plaintiff can receive significantly higher or 
lower compensation.  
The inconsistencies described so far are situated within the damages context. In  
liability determinations, however, courts have consistently held that simple probability is 
unavailable, and proof of facts must be to the balance of probabilities standard. The 
outcomes resulting from this position have been met with some academic criticism. In 
Part 2, I provide reasons for endorsing this position. 
The confusion and resultant inconsistencies over where simple probability reason-
ing should apply suggest that a new and more comprehensive framework for its use is 
required. The current situation allows for the possibility of subjecting similarly situated 
plaintiffs to different legal principles, leading to significantly different outcomes. Sup-
pose, for instance, a plaintiff had a 40% prospect of getting a better job if her injury had 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Ibid at para 28. 
26 Ibid at para 29. 
27 Sales v Clarke (1998), 57 B.C.L.R. (3d) 36 at para 11, 165 DLR (4th) 241. The Court of Appeal in Smith, supra 
note 21 sought to distinguish Sales v Clarke on the basis that it concerned a causal relationship, as opposed to 
proof of loss. Whether or not that is a legitimate distinction, the quotation provided above is undoubtedly 
contrastable with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in Smith, supra note 21. 
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not occurred. One judge could decide that simple probability applies to past hypothet-
ical facts, so the 40% chance of a better job should be reflected in the damages award. 
Another might decide that simple probability does not apply to past facts, and since the 
chance of a better job could not be proven on a balance of probabilities (being that 
there is only a 40% chance), the plaintiff would not be compensated for that lost pro-
spect. Despite the similar circumstances, the two plaintiffs would receive very different 
damages awards. Under the uncertain state of the current law, either of these outcomes 
could be justified. 
Nevertheless, if inconsistency and uncertainty were the only concerns, then the 
analysis would be aimed at deciding which type(s) of facts (past, hypothetical, future) 
simple probability should apply to and arguing that these facts must receive consistent 
treatment; yet the problem is not simply that courts have been inconsistent. The more 
fundamental problem is that the ‘type of fact’ approach is conceptually incoherent.  
The ‘type of fact’ approach is grounded in a misunderstanding of simple probability 
reasoning. When simple probability is understood as a way of proving facts, its availabil-
ity would naturally depend on which types of facts warrant proof by simple probability, 
as opposed to the balance of probabilities. However, the characterization of simple 
probability as a method of proving facts is flawed. Simple probability reasoning is not a 
standard of proof. Its availability, therefore, should not depend on a classification of 
which facts are to be proven by simple probability rather than a balance of probabilities. 
The simple probability principle is not aimed at proving facts at all. As I will demon-
strate, simple probability reasoning is better characterized as a method of quantifying 
chance. 
Re-Characterizing Simple Probability 
Simple probability reasoning is often understood to encompass a different standard 
of proof than the balance of probabilities.28 Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders subscribe 
to this description in Personal Injury Damages in Canada. For instance, in discussing proof 
of claims for cost of future care, they note that “[b]asic principles apply, and it must be 
emphasized that the standard of proof is ‘simple probability’—a different standard than 
the normal balance of probabilities test.”29 Similarly, in discussing damages assessment 
generally, Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders suggest that: 
                                                                                                                                            
28 The judicial authorities noted above lend themselves to this description and Canadian Courts virtually 
always refer to simple probability as a standard of proof when they discuss it expressly. For example, Grimard v 
Berry (1992), 102 Sask R 137, 33 ACWS (3d) 892 and Parent v Andrews, 2001 SKQB 266 at para 9, 105 ACWS 
(3d) 412, both citing Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, state: “For the most part, in assessing damages, a 
court proceeds on a different standard of proof then it does when determining civil liability: simple probability 
as opposed to a balance of probabilities” [emphasis added]. The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench stated in 
Ganderton v Brown, 2004 ABQB 366 at 261, 33 Alta LR (4th) 271 that: “The applicable standard of proof for 
the assessment of damages in a personal injury action is simple probability Tat v Ellis (1999), 228 AR 263 
(CA); Stevens v Okrainec (1997), 210 AR 161 (QB).” The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Reilly v Lynn, 
2003 BCCA 49, 178 BCAC 69 stated at para 101: “The standard of proof in relation to future events is simple 
probability, not the balance of probabilities, and hypothetical events are to be given weight according to their 
relative likelihood: Athey v Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458 at para 27.” 
29 Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Iwan Saunders, Personal Injury Damages in Canada, 2d ed (Scarborough, Ontario: 
Carswell, 1996) at 414. 
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At the root of damage assessment is a different standard or method of 
proof…The different standard of proof which governs most of a damage  
assessment may be termed “simple probability.” It involves the valuation of 
possibilities, chances and risks according to the degree of likelihood that 
events would have occurred, or will occur. This contrasts with the “balance 
of probabilities” standard, more familiar in civil actions, which involves an 
“all-or-nothing” approach.30  
Presumably, the description of simple probability as a standard of proof arises be-
cause the impact of simple probability reasoning on future facts is often contrasted with 
the impact of balance of probability reasoning on past facts. The balance of probabili-
ties standard is accompanied by an “all-or-nothing” impact because if a proposed fact is 
proven on the balance of probabilities, it is thereafter treated as a legal certainty. The 
subsequent determination will be based on that fact as though it were certainly true 
because it has become a legal fact. Conversely, if a fact is not proven on the balance of 
probabilities, it is taken to be untrue for the purpose of the legal determination. This 
allows uncertain fact to be translated into legal certainty, so the legal determination can 
be made on the basis of established facts. 
When simple probability reasoning applies, however, the future or hypothetical 
events themselves are not translated into legal certainties. Instead, the possibility of the 
future or hypothetical event is relevant. If the occurrence of some future event (“future 
fact”) is 30% likely, for instance, this 30% likelihood has legal significance. And if the 
future fact is 60% likely, then this 60% likelihood has legal significance. In contrast, 
when the balance of probabilities applied, the likelihood itself has no substantive legal 
relevance. 
The proportional impact of simple probability versus the all-or-nothing impact of 
the balance of probabilities causes an inclination to contrast the two approaches, as if 
they were both in the business of establishing legal facts. For example, after recounting 
the use of simple probability reasoning in Schrump v Koot, where the Court endorsed 
probabilistic damages founded on the likelihood of a future surgery, Cassels suggests: 
[I]t is important to note that the court rejected an all-or-nothing approach 
under which the plaintiff receives 100 percent compensation if it can be 
shown that the loss is ‘likely’ to occur and nothing if it is ‘unlikely’ to occur. 
Instead, uncertainty about the future is reflected in the amount of the award, 
‘with the higher degree or the greater chance or risk of a future development 
attracting a higher award’ [quoting Schrump v Koot].31 
I agree that where a court compensates for a risk of a future event, it prevents the 
future fact itself from being subjected to the balance of probabilities and all-or-nothing 
approach. As Cooper has suggested, the use of simple probability reasoning indicates 
that the creation of a risk is really what is being compensated, not the future event.32 
This idea has been well stated: “Where a defendant deprives a plaintiff not of an ex-
                                                                                                                                            
30 Ibid at 67.  
31 Jamie Cassels & Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Remedies: The Law of Damages, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008) 
at 331. 
32 Ken Cooper, “Assessing Possibilities in Damages Awards – The Loss of a Chance or the Chance of a Loss” 
(1972-73) 37 Sask L Rev 193. See especially 222 and 231-235. 
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pected future benefit, but of his chance to gain that benefit, then surely the loss suffered 
is plaintiff’s chance, not the benefit itself.”33  
What needs clarification is what must follow from the recognition that simple 
probability enables compensation for a risk, in its own right. If simple probability is a 
way to compensate for a risk, it follows that this risk itself is the legally relevant fact, not 
the potential future or hypothetical outcome. If the risk itself is legally relevant, then 
proving the outcome of that risk is not. Whether or not the outcome will occur is irrele-
vant to the question of whether there is a risk that the outcome will occur, and the value 
of that risk. Simple probability is a way to value a risk or chance, once its existence is 
established. 
Where simple probability applies, future or hypothetical events avoid being subject 
to the balance of probabilities and all-or-nothing approach, not because simple probabil-
ity reasoning is a different standard of proof for future or hypothetical facts, but 
because these facts are not subject to proof at all. Rather, simple probability allows us to 
understand chances as valuable and potentially relevant to legal determinations. If the 
chance is the fact that is relevant to the legal determination, then its existence must be 
established as a legal fact. Like all legal facts, the existence of the chance must be estab-
lished on a balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof that is applicable to all 
relevant legal facts. Then, simple probability applies as a method valuing the chance. 
Leading cases are consistent with this explanation. For example, in Schrump v Koot, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the plaintiff is not obligated to prove that a 
future loss or damage will occur.34 Rather, the obligation is to establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, a non-speculative possibility of such a future loss. Similarly, in Kovats v 
Ogilvie, simple probability reasoning was employed to account for the possibility of 
developing “post traumatic arthritis resulting from the injury” in a serious motor vehicle 
collision.35 The British Columbia Court of Appeal explained that the balance of proba-
bilities standard is applicable to establish the existence of a risk: 
It is a fundamental rule that in civil cases questions of fact are to be decided 
on a balance of probabilities; this is a matter of proof…one can decide on a 
balance of probabilities that there is a risk of something happening in the fu-
ture. In an appropriate case such a risk can be taken into account in assessing 
damages for the wrongful act or default that caused it.36 
In short, situations employing simple probability reasoning can be understood as 
follows: suppose a plaintiff claims that due to his injuries, there is a chance that he will 
require a future surgery. For this chance to be relevant to his damages entitlement, he 
has to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the tortious injuries gave rise to a risk 
that he will require a future surgery. If established, then the existence of this chance will 
bear some impact on his damages entitlement. The extent of this impact is determined 
through simple probability reasoning. 
The notion that simple probability is itself a standard of proof indicates a deep lack 
of conceptual clarity. The problem is not limited to semantic impropriety. Mischaracter-
                                                                                                                                            
33 “Damages Contingent Upon Chance” (1963-1964) 18 Rutgers L Rev 875. 
34 Schrump, supra note 8 at 4 (cited to QL page numbers). 
35 Kovats, supra note 7 at 5. 
36 Ibid at 6. 
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izing simple probability reasoning has substantive implications. Most significantly, mis-
understanding simple probability reasoning has led to the ‘type of fact’ approach, which 
yields inconsistent application of the doctrine.  
The Problem of Mischaracterizing Simple Probability Reasoning 
Canadian courts invariably apply the ‘type of fact’ approach, which is based on a 
mischaracterization of simple probability as a method of proof, and which results in 
conceptual and practical trouble. The ‘type of fact’ approach yields four potential 
frameworks in which simple probability reasoning operates, but which courts have 
inconsistently adopted: 
1. Apply simple probability to future facts and not to past facts, hypothetical or  
otherwise. 
2. Apply simple probability to future and hypothetical facts, but not to past facts. 
3. Abandon simple probability reasoning: apply balance of probabilities to all 
facts. 
4. Abandon the balance of probabilities standard: apply simple probability to all  
relevant facts. 
Problematically, consistent application of each one of these frameworks would 
compromise either the principle of liability determination or of damages assessment. 
Each one would ignore chances where they should be relevant, or consider chances 
where they should not be relevant.  
Framework 1 cannot satisfy the demands of damages assessments because it would 
prevent courts from taking into account pre-existing conditions when assessing  
damages. In order to account for pre-existing conditions, a court must consider the 
hypothetical past fact of whether, even absent the tort, the pre-existing condition could 
have resulted in the plaintiff’s harm. Framework 1 requires that all past facts must be 
proven on a balance of probabilities, so pre-existing conditions and the potential harm 
they could have caused would have to be subjected to the balance of probabilities 
standard. This would effectively prevent pre-existing conditions from being taken into 
account at all. 
It is inevitable that a pre-existing condition will have a less than 50% chance of 
having caused the plaintiff’s claimed harm. Otherwise, the requisite causal link between 
the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm would be negated. In order to estab-
lish causation (and therefore liability), the plaintiff must show, on a balance of 
probabilities, that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff’s harm would not 
have occurred. This would be impossible if a pre-existing condition gave rise to a great-
er than 50% likelihood of harm because it would be more likely that the harm resulted 
from the pre-existing condition, rather than the defendant’s negligence. Under frame-
work 1, a pre-existing condition could never co-exist with a finding of liability, which is 
contrary to the demands of damages assessment. If pre-existing conditions are to have 
legal significance (as the compensation principle demands), they must be relevant in 
terms of the chance of harm they create. Simple probability, properly understood, must 
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be used when assessing the value of the chance of harm owing to the pre-existing con-
ditions.37 
Framework 2 allows any hypothetical and future facts to be subject to simple prob-
ability reasoning. This is incompatible with the usual analysis for establishing causation 
under the ‘but for’ test, where the plaintiff must show that ‘but for’ the defendant’s 
negligence, her injury would not have occurred.38 This test requires that the court de-
termine what would have occurred if, hypothetically, the defendant’s negligence had not 
occurred.39 Since the ‘but for’ analysis necessitates a hypothetical inquiry, Framework 2 
would require all causal inquiries to be subjected to simple probability rather than the 
balance of probabilities. Accordingly, Framework 2 cannot be comprehensive because it 
cannot be applied consistently.40  
This leaves the more drastic options: Frameworks 3 and 4. Framework 3 requires 
exclusive use of the balance of probabilities. Framework 3 is agreeable to the extent that 
it requires the balance of probabilities to apply to all facts. However, Framework 3 
contains the erroneous idea that if the balance of probabilities is the exclusive standard 
of proof, then simple probability must be abandoned altogether. When simple probabil-
ity is properly understood as a way to value chances, rather than as a standard of proof, 
abandoning it means that chances would never count as legal facts. I already suggested 
that pre-existing chances of harm must be relevant to damages assessments; chances 
must also be relevant for determining compensatory entitlements. Therefore, abandon-
ing simple probability altogether is incompatible with the demands of damages 
assessments. 
Finally, under Framework 4, all facts would be subject to simple probability reason-
ing rather than the balance of probabilities. Although this option is implausible, it is a 
conceivable option that can arise from the erroneous conception of simple probability 
as a method of proof. At least in theory, exclusive reliance on simple probability would 
mean that all pertinent facts would be relevant only to the extent of their likelihood. 
Under this approach, no fact could be considered ‘established.’ Instead, the chance that 
some fact occurred would be relevant. This approach is entirely incompatible with the 
requirements of liability determination. 
Given that none of the frameworks arising from the ‘type of fact’ approach is  
acceptable, it is hardly surprising that Canadian courts do not apply any one of them 
consistently. To be clear, I do not suggest that the ‘type of fact’ approach necessarily 
results in erroneous outcomes. My claim is that because courts rely on the ‘type of fact’ 
                                                                                                                                            
37 I elaborate on this argument below in Part 3. 
38 Discussion about the merits of the ‘but for’ test for establishing causation is outside the scope of this paper, 
but see for example Vaughan Black, “Decision Causation: Pandora’s Tool-Box” and Richard Wright, “Acts 
and Omissions as Positive and Negative Causes” in J Neyers et al, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2007); Jane Stapleton, “Unnecessary Causes” 129 Law Q Rev 39 (2013); Richard Goldberg, 
ed, Perspectives on Causation (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
39 As Black notes in “Not a Chance: Comments on Waddams, The Valuation of Chances” (1998) 30 Can Bus 
LJ 96 at 99: “It is uncontroversial that, regardless of the nature of the cause of action, future uncertainties 
should be assessed on a probabilistic basis. But to say that this is true of past hypotheticals seems to overlook 
that every application of the but-for test of factual causation necessarily involves a hypothetical.” [References 
removed]. 
40 This conclusion could provoke the argument that the causal analysis should be subject to simple probability, 
and if so, then Framework 2 could not be painted as incapable of consistent application. I evaluate this sug-
gestion in Part 2.  
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approach, the only possible resulting frameworks would compromise some other legal 
principle. There is currently no coherent framework for the availability of the simple 
probability principle that could ensure its consistent use throughout personal injury 
adjudication. Depending on which legal principle is argued or emphasized, courts can 
conceivably reach different conclusions in similar circumstances. The result is a condi-
tion of overall incoherence, leaving litigants susceptible to inaccurate yet binding 
adjudicative outcomes. 
A comprehensive framework for the use of simple probability is impossible while 
harbouring a mischaracterization of what simple probability actually accomplishes. 
When properly understood, where simple probability should be used depends on when 
chances should and should not have legal significance. Applying this characterization, I 
determine whether chances are relevant in the two ultimate legal determinations in a 
personal injury action: liability and damages assessments. These discussions culminate in 
a framework for where simple probability must and must not be available since it should 
only be available where chances are relevant. 
PART 2: CHANCES AND SIMPLE PROBABILITY IN LIABILITY STAGE 
The Traditional Irrelevance of Chances  
Establishing liability for negligently inflicted harm is contingent on satisfying cer-
tain legal principles. First, only a defendant who owes a duty of care can be liable to a 
plaintiff. Second, a plaintiff can only recover against a defendant who negligently 
breached the standard of care owed. Third, the breach of the standard of care must 
have caused the plaintiff’s loss, and finally, the plaintiff must have suffered a compensa-
ble injury. Together, these principles form the substantive law that provides individuals 
with an enforceable legal right against another person who negligently inflicts an injury. 
The protection of that legal right is the purpose of a finding of liability. 
The substantive principles that define the right against negligently inflicted injury 
translate into the factual elements that must be established for a finding of liability.41 
These factual elements must be proven on the more-likely-than-not standard. There-
fore, a 51% chance is relevant to the process of proof, but it does not influence the 
substance of the question at stake for a liability determination. The substantive questions 
are defined by the nature of the right that is protected by the law of liability for negli-
gent infliction of injury. Liability is contingent on: (i) the existence of a duty of care, not 
the chance of a duty of care, (ii) the fact that a breach of a standard of care occurred, 
not the chance thereof, and (iii) the fact that an injury was caused by the negligence, not 
the chance that an injury was caused. A liability determination, therefore, demands 
proof of those factual elements. The chance of the fact is not substantively relevant. 
Accordingly, simple probability as a mechanism to give value to a relevant chance has 
no use in the traditional liability analysis. The question is whether or not the traditional 
approach can be justified. 
                                                                                                                                            
41 Arguably, the existence of a duty of care is not a factual question, but a policy question. Here, I do not 
presume a significant distinction between the question of the existence of a duty of care and the remaining 
factual elements that must be established for a finding of liability. 
204 PROBABILISTIC REASONING IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION Vol. 23 
!
Causal Indeterminacy and the Perception of Unfairness 
The problem of causal indeterminacy provides a fruitful ground to discuss the mer-
its of the customary liability analysis. In that context, the irrelevance of chances has, to 
some, appeared unjust, leading to arguments in favour of accommodating chances in 
liability determinations. Addressing such arguments illustrates the wisdom of the current 
approach, where chances are not relevant, and simple probability has no function in 
making liability determinations.  
Causal Indeterminacy: General 
Typically, establishing causation requires that a plaintiff show that ‘but for’ the de-
fendant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred. Medico-scientific uncertainty 
can render the causal link between negligence and injury impossible to prove, and deny-
ing recovery to plaintiffs in that circumstance has appeared unfair to some. In a number 
of personal injury cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has deliberated over whether this 
situation of evidentiary uncertainty warrants a substantive change to establishing liabil-
ity. Over the course of these decisions, the Supreme Court has rejected the proposal that 
establishing a ‘material increase in risk of harm’ should result in the onus shifting to the 
defendant to negate a presumption of causation;42 provided a number of reminders that 
scientific precision is not a pre-requisite to proof of causation on the balance of proba-
bilities standard,43 advocated a ‘robust and pragmatic’ approach to the balance of 
probabilities standard of proof for causation;44 and reconfirmed that the test for causa-
tion is the ‘but for’ test,45 while introducing (arguably, quite ambiguously) the limited 
availability of the ‘material contribution’ test.46 
While these cases display the Supreme Court’s commitment to the fairness of the 
‘but for’ test when the balance of probabilities is applied properly, they also reveal a 
recent trend of proposals that some change to the causal analysis is warranted. This 
trend has led to a class of causal indeterminacy cases that provides an arena for discuss-
ing the availability of simple probability reasoning, as well as the potential for the 
relevance of chances in the liability context. These are cases where plaintiffs suffer med-
ical adversities after being misdiagnosed by their treatment providers. The ‘but for’ 
causal connection between the negligent misdiagnosis and the ultimate adverse outcome 
cannot be proven on the balance of probabilities, so the plaintiff is denied recovery. 
This circumstance incites what is known as the ‘loss of chance’ argument. 
The loss of chance doctrine, and its proposed application are best explained 
through a hypothetical example. Suppose a doctor negligently fails to inform the plain-
tiff of a medical condition, causing a delay in treatment. Once the plaintiff’s condition is 
                                                                                                                                            
42 This approach was adopted by the House of Lords in McGhee v National Coal Board, [1972] 3 All ER 1008 
HL (Eng) and the Supreme Court of Canada was urged to adopt this reasoning in Snell v Farrell. 
43 Snell v Farrell, [1990] 2 SCR 311, 72 DLR (4th) 289 [Snell]; Resurfice Corp v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 SCR 
333[Resurfice]; and Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32, 346 DLR (4th) 577 [Clements]. 
44 See Snell, supra note 43, generally, and at para 29. 
45 Most recent confirmation appears in Ediger v Johnston, 2013 SCC 18, 356 DLR (4th) 575. In this case, the 
factual finding of causation was at issue, not the legal test for causation. At para 28, though, the Supreme 
Court briefly re-confirmed the ‘but for’ test for causation, referring to its earlier decisions in Resurfice and 
Clements, supra note 43. 
46 Athey, supra note 4, Resurfice and Clements, supra note 43. 
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properly diagnosed, it becomes clear that her prognosis is poor, and she sues the doctor 
in negligence. Eventually, the plaintiff dies of the medical condition. In order to estab-
lish liability, the plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that ‘but for’ the 
doctor’s negligence, the adverse outcome (in this example, the patient’s death) would 
not have occurred.  
Where the plaintiff’s chance of survival prior to the misdiagnosis was less than 
50%, it would not be possible for the plaintiff to establish on a balance of probabilities 
that he would have survived ‘but for’ the doctor’s negligence because, even absent any 
act of negligence, the adverse outcome was already more likely to occur than not. The 
House of Lords and the Supreme Court of Canada have encountered this circumstance, 
and have been presented with the argument that the reduction in the plaintiff’s chance 
of avoiding the adverse outcome should be compensable. 
The House of Lords most recently considered the loss of chance argument in Gregg 
v Scott,47 but denied its applicability in British medical negligence law. In that case, a 
claim was brought against Dr. Scott, who had acted negligently in failing to diagnose a 
malignant lump that afflicted his patient. The failure to diagnose led to treatment being 
delayed by nine months, during which, the cancer spread. The plaintiff claimed that the 
doctor’s negligence, which led to the late treatment, prevented him from being cured of 
his disease, or at least reduced his chances of being cured.  
The evidence presented at trial indicated that the plaintiff’s chance of survival was 
42%, prior to any act of negligence. These prospects were reduced to 25% by the time 
of the trial.48 The trial judge dismissed the claim because causation could not be estab-
lished. The plaintiff’s chance of survival prior to the doctor’s negligence was already less 
than 50%.49 On appeal to the House of Lords, the plaintiff argued that rather than 
requiring proof that the delay in treatment caused the detrimental outcome, the reduc-
tion in his chance of being cured should be compensated. If this were an acceptable 
analysis, then the causal link to be established would be between the negligence and the 
reduction in the chance of recovery, rather than the doctor’s negligence and the actual 
adverse outcome. The majority of the Lords rejected the invitation to apply the loss of 
chance doctrine, preferring the traditional approach that requires proof that the negli-
gence caused the adverse outcome.  
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the loss of chance doctrine in Lafferiere v 
Lawson.50 There, Fortien-Depuis commenced an action in negligence against her doctor 
for negligently failing to inform her of her cancerous condition. She died of generalized 
cancer prior to the completion of the legal proceedings. Her estate argued that though it 
was impossible to prove on a balance of probabilities that her fate would have been any 
different absent the doctor’s negligence, it could be established that the doctor’s negli-
gence decreased her chance of a more positive outcome. That reduction in chance, the 
plaintiff suggested, ought to be compensable. Writing for the majority, Gonthier J. 
refused to apply the loss of chance doctrine by endorsing the traditional requirement to 
                                                                                                                                            
47 Gregg v Scott, [2005] UKHL 2 HL (Eng) [Gregg]. The House of Lords has also considered the loss of chance 
argument in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority, [1987] AC 750 HL (Eng) [Hotson], and Wilsher v Essex 
Area Health Authority, [1988] AC 1074 HL (Eng). 
48 Gregg, supra note 47 at para 5. 
49 Ibid at para 6. 
50 Lafferiere v Lawson, [1991] 1 SCR 541, 78 DLR (4th) 609. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision in St-Jean 
v Mercier, 2002 SCC 15, [2002] 1 SCR 491. 
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prove the causal link between the negligence and the injury itself. The Court held that 
the defendant could not be liable because causation was not established. 
Despite the Courts’ traditionalism, outcomes where a plaintiff is treated negligently 
and endures some adverse outcome, yet remains uncompensated, can lead to the per-
ception that the causal analysis yields unfair results in liability for misdiagnosis.51 The 
perceived unfairness leads to two arguments. The first is the loss of chance argument 
advanced in the cases above. This argument would constitute a substantive change to 
liability determinations by allowing a chance of an injury to be a compensable damage 
and therefore a relevant fact. Under this approach, rather than escaping liability alto-
gether, the extent of the defendant’s liability would be proportional to the value of the 
lost chance. This can be understood as using simple probability reasoning in the liability 
context. I explain why the loss of chance argument is undesirable below. 
The second potential solution to the perceived unfairness is even more drastic. 
Loss of chance is fundamentally a criticism of the balance of probabilities and all-or-
nothing approach to legal fact-finding. Dissatisfaction with the usual approach to fact-
finding can lead to an argument for simple probability reasoning to replace the usual 
approach to fact-finding in the liability context. This approach is also unfeasible.  
The Difficulty with Loss of Chance 
The loss of chance argument has two components. First, proponents argue that 
lost chances should be compensable because chances constitute something of value. 
Urging more receptivity to the loss of chance argument, Waddams, for instance, com-
ments that “people suffering from illnesses do, of course, often give money, even for an 
insubstantial chance of a cure.”52 Similarly, making a case for imposing liability for risks 
of future harm (or the loss of a chance of a better outcome) Porat and Stein persuasive-
ly explain that a chance or a risk has definite value:  
Consider two people who happen to be equal in all respects except one: one 
of those people has a prospect of developing a serious illness in the future, 
while the other has no such prospect. The second person’s well-being out-
scores the well-being of the first person (if forced to live one of those 
people’s lives, a rational individual would prefer to be the second person than 
the first).53 
Given that chances are valuable, proponents argue that a lost chance or increased 
risk should be a compensable injury, whether or not a plaintiff suffered a physical injury. 
In Jane Stapleton’s terms, the lost chance becomes the ‘gist’ of the legal action.54 Defin-
                                                                                                                                            
51 See, for example, SM Waddams, “The Valuation of Chances” (1998) 30 Can Bus LJ 86 [Waddams, Chances], 
and compare Vaughan Black, “Not a Chance: Comments on Waddams, the Valuation of Chances” supra note 
39; Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 31, comment that: “In cases like Lafferiere, the defendant’s negligence 
has indeed deprived the plaintiff of a valuable chance (to seek medical treatment). It is hard to discern why she 
should not receive compensation for this loss…It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will revisit this 
issue” at 341-342. 
52 Waddams, Chances, supra note 51 at 89. 
53 Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, “Liability for Future Harm” in Goldberg, supra note 38 at 234. 
54 Jane Stapleton, “The Gist of Negligence, Part 2: The Relationship Between ‘Damage’ and Causation” (1988) 
104 Law Q Rev 389 [Stapleton, “Gist”]. 
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ing the lost chance as the injury gives rise to the second component of the loss of 
chance argument. When the lost chance is the compensable injury, the problem of 
causal indeterminacy is resolved without any change to the traditional approach to  
establishing causation, which the Supreme Court is reluctant to alter. Under the loss of 
chance approach, all relevant facts, including causation, remain subject to the balance of 
probabilities, except now the loss suffered is not the outcome of the chance but the lost 
chance itself.  
Joseph King and later Jane Stapleton both independently articulated this argument. 
They argued that when courts have rejected the loss of chance argument, they have 
been distracted by their commitment to treating causation as an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion.55 Over-emphasizing this commitment, King suggests, “most courts have 
misperceived the nature of the interest destroyed by failing to identify the destroyed 
chance itself as the compensable loss.”56 When the lost chance is understood as the 
compensable injury, the concern that the lost chance argument erodes the balance of 
probabilities standard is artificial. To the extent that the loss of chance approach does 
not advocate any abandonment of the balance of probabilities approach to legal fact-
finding, it does not alter the analysis in this paper. However, I do not consider the loss 
of chance approach to be desirable, and it does not address the perception of unfairness 
that gives rise to it.  
I take no issue with the premise that a loss of a chance (or increased risk) results in 
a valuable change in the plaintiff’s life.57 I disagree, however, that because a chance is 
valuable its loss should enable an imposition of liability. As Robert Stevens puts it, “the 
mere fact that [a chance] is a real loss is an insufficient reason to hold it to be always 
actionable where inflicted through fault.”58 Framing the question of actionability of 
damage in terms of the rights that are protected by a finding of liability, Stevens points 
out, “the rights we have against everyone else are in relation to the outcome of injury, 
not its risk of occurring in the future.”59 Where there is no right against others for in-
creased risks or lost chances, it follows that there cannot be liability imposed for causing 
such harms. As Ernest Weinrib suggests: 
Injury is essential to liability for negligence; no matter how culpable the de-
fendant’s act, the defendant cannot be held liable for negligence unless the 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Joseph King Jr, “Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Condi-
tions and Future Consequences” (1981) 90(6) Yale LJ 1353at 1363; Ibid. Stapleton argues that the court’s 
rejection of the loss of chance argument in Hotson, supra note 47, did not provide an answer to the re-
characterization of the plaintiff’s claim as a ‘loss of a chance.’ The House of Lords held that the plaintiff had 
to establish the causal link to the injury itself, on a balance of probabilities, and since this could not be done, 
the action failed. 
56 King, supra note 55 at 1365. 
57 Compare SR Perry, “Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence” (1992) 42 UTLJ 247 
at 255-67. Perry argues that a lost chance cannot be defined as real loss at all. This view is inconsistent with 
my comments in Part 3, where I suggest that lost chances and increased risks are indeed compensable harms 
to be taken into account when assessing a plaintiff’s damages. I argue here that these losses cannot sustain a 
liability determination. 
58 Robert Stevens, Rights and Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 43. 
59 Ibid at 44. 
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defendant’s act resulted in an injury to the plaintiff. Thus, without the mate-
rialization of the risk into injury, no liability can arise.60 
If the creation of a risk constituted an enforceable right as against another individu-
al, a person may have suffered no physical injury, yet still have a right to recover 
damages. Individuals could be liable to each other for creating any adverse risks. For 
instance, a speeding driver could be liable to all other drivers he shared a road with 
because he increased their risk of being harmed. Moreover, any possible cause of action 
for an injury could be framed as a ‘loss of a chance.’ In Gregg v Scott, Baroness Hale 
pointed this out as follows:  
[A]lmost any claim for loss of an outcome could be reformulated as a claim 
for loss of a chance of that outcome…That is, the claimants still has the pro-
spect of 100% recovery if he can show that it is more likely than not that the 
doctor’s negligence caused the adverse outcome. But if he cannot show that, 
he also has the prospect of lesser recovery for loss of a chance.61 
The loss of chance approach, as Baroness Hale comments, would shift personal in-
jury law from a system of compensating injuries to one of compensating risks.62 So, 
while proponents suggest that the loss of chance proposal does not significantly alter 
the traditional legal analysis for establishing causation, their approach would cause a 
foundational change to determining liability for negligence as it does away with the 
requirement for a manifested injury. Despite its appeal in the misdiagnosis context, 
compromising the requirement for a manifested injury by allowing chances to constitute 
compensable harms would have objectionable implications for the law of liability for 
negligently inflicted injury.  
If the loss of chance argument is rejected, then what of the perceived unfairness 
that arises in misdiagnosis cases? Stapleton has provided a telling criticism of the tradi-
tional analysis, referring to Hotson.63 In that case, the plaintiff had a 75% chance of 
adverse outcome before any negligence. Consequently, he was denied recovery because 
he was unable to establish that, ‘but for’ the negligence, he would have been injury-free. 
Rather, he was ‘doomed’ to be injured, as far as the law was concerned, with or without 
negligence. Stapleton argues that ignoring the 25% chance that the plaintiff was not 
doomed amounts to unfairness to the plaintiff, prompting the loss of chance argu-
ment.64 
If it is unfair to treat the 75% chance that the inherent condition caused the injury 
as a legal certainty and to treat the 25% chance that the injury would not have occurred 
despite the inherent condition as legally irrelevant, then balance of probabilities proof 
must be considered unfair altogether. The balance of probabilities standard always ena-
bles courts to ignore possibilities that the facts that are found for legal determinations 
may not correspond to factual reality. All legally relevant facts, including causation, are 
decided on the 51% standard of proof, which allows courts to ignore possibilities of up 
                                                                                                                                            
60 Ernest Weinrib, Tort Law: Cases and Materials, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 
2009) at 223. 
61 Gregg, supra note 47 at 223. 
62 Ibid at 222. 
63 Hotson, supra note 47. 
64 Stapleton, “Gist”, supra note 54 at 393. 
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to 49% that the fact that was found for legal purposes was not a fact in reality. The 
perception of unfairness that leads to the loss of chance argument can therefore be 
traced to a criticism of the process of legal fact-finding. But under the loss of chance 
approach, all legal facts must still be proven on the balance of probabilities. In fact, 
maintaining the traditional method of proof is presented as one of its virtues. Therefore, 
the loss of chance doctrine fails to address the criticism that renders it attractive in the 
first place.65 
The standard of proof and all-or-nothing process of legal fact-finding are some-
times criticized. I turn now to consider the merits of such a critique. The alternative to 
the usual approach is probability-based fact-finding and proportional liability. This 
implicates simple probability reasoning throughout the liability determination, which I 
argue is an implausible approach. 
The Impossibility of Simple Probability in the Liability Context 
The usual approach to legal fact-finding, where a fact is proven to a standardized 
likelihood and then treated as if it were certainly true, can seem like an attempt to create 
an illusion of certainty in adjudication. Not only might a critic find this unduly artifi-
cial,66 it may also appear to cause arbitrary results because some chances (any chances 
more than 50%) lead to 100% compensation while other chances (any chances of 50% 
or less) lead to 0% compensation.67 As an alternative, one could suggest chance-based 
fact-finding where, rather than translating uncertain facts into legal certainties, the 
chance or likelihood of a fact would remain legally relevant, leading to proportionality 
instead of all-or-nothing outcomes throughout the adjudicative process. This would 
have undesirable implications for the substantive law of liability determinations. Moreo-
ver, a liability determination, by its nature, prevents chance-based fact-finding.  
Chance-based fact-finding must not be understood as merely changing the process 
of fact-finding. Rather, this approach alters the substantive principles that form the 
basis of liability for personal injury. The principles of liability dictate that only if a de-
fendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and breaches his standard of care resulting in 
an injury to the plaintiff, is the defendant liable to compensate the plaintiff. Although 
these facts must be proven to be more than 51% likely, the actual likelihood of the fact 
is not substantively relevant. A liability determination reflects only whether the requisite 
facts were proven or not; it does not reflect the extent to which they were proven. A 
                                                                                                                                            
65 Causal indeterminacy tends to provoke perceptions of unfairness more than factual uncertainty over any 
other element of a liability. That could imply something unique about causation, yet my comments above 
suggest otherwise. Whether or not there is any substantive difference between causation and the other factual 
elements, the critique of the causal analysis that leads to the loss of chance argument is situated within the 
process of proving causation, which is the same process of proof as all the other factual elements. 
66 Consider Coons’ comment: “As with other men, uncertainty goes down hard with lawyers. Unable wholly 
to eradicate it, they are under an abiding temptation to disguise it. Where it persists, they have learned to 
sweep it under the rug with a grand gesture…Most splendid of the rules-and sheltered by a whole panoply of 
major premises-is winner-take-all.” John Coons, “Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise – The Uses of 
Doubt and Reason” (1963-1964) 58 Nw UL Rev 750 at 755. 
67 See for example King, supra note 55 at 1376-1377. See also Coons, supra note 66. Coons argues for a pro-
portional liability approach where there is one determinative fact at issue, and its chance is evenly balanced. In 
this context, he suggests that the ‘winner-take-all’ approach should ‘trouble the conscience.’ Coons does not 
advocate an abandonment of the winner-take-all approach all together, but his comments echo the sentiment 
of unfairness that can accompany the all-or-nothing approach. 
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dramatic change would occur if chance-based fact-finding were introduced. Under that 
approach, the likelihood of the fact must bear impact on the substantive determination at 
stake. The proportionality of the fact must remain relevant to, and be reflected in, the 
ultimate legal outcome.  
If the chance of a factual element were relevant, the substantive questions for a lia-
bility determination would become: was there a chance of a duty, a chance of a breach, and 
a chance that the defendant caused the injury? If these are the questions at stake in a 
liability determination, then by implication, individuals would have an enforceable right 
to be free from possible breaches of possible duties of care that have some likelihood of caus-
ing some potential injury. Not only is this contrary to established principles of what can be 
actionable in law, such an approach would obviously lead to increased exposure to 
liability, and a state of perpetual uncertainty over whether a cause of action exists. This 
unrealistic state of affairs would result if the usual fact-finding method were replaced 
with a simple probability and proportional outcome approach. 
There is a second fatal problem with exchanging the balance of probabilities for 
simple probability. Using a probabilistic fact-finding model, a court could potentially 
come to the following conclusion: the evidence indicates a 100% chance that a duty of 
care exists, a 60% chance that the standard of care was breached, 10% chance of causa-
tion, and 90% chance of injury. Given these findings, what basis would a court have to 
find the defendant liable to the plaintiff?  
Unless the proportionality of the factual elements can be reflected in the ultimate 
outcome, the likelihood of the event beyond the threshold level is substantively mean-
ingless, just like the likelihood of a fact becomes meaningless if it passes the 51% 
standard of proof. But the proportionality of facts cannot be reflected in a liability de-
termination. A liability determination is itself an “all-or-nothing” determination because 
there are only two possible outcomes: a defendant is either liable, or she is not. It is not 
possible for a determination that has only two possible outcomes to reflect the unique 
proportionality of all its necessary factual elements. A concoction of chances cannot be 
echoed in a liability determination, and so it becomes clear that only the all-or-nothing 
method of fact-finding can be applied. 
The binary nature of liability determination may become masked by failing to con-
ceptually separate the question of whether a defendant is liable, from the question of the 
extent of her liability. Whether a defendant is liable at all is the primary inquiry that must 
be satisfied before any question of how liable he is can even be entertained. What pro-
portion of the plaintiff’s injury is compensable can only be considered after it is 
determined that the defendant owes anything at all. Whether a defendant owes anything 
to the plaintiff is contingent on the presence of each of the factual principles of liability. 
If any one of the requisite factual elements is not established, then liability is a ‘no’; if 
every factual element is established, then liability is a ‘yes.’ There is no room for propor-
tionality in such an inquiry. Conversely, the second inquiry, where the extent of a 
plaintiff’s damages entitlement is determined, is not binary in nature. It is driven by 
distinct principles, and can reflect proportions.68 Accordingly, simple probability must 
                                                                                                                                            
68 One may point out the concept of contributory negligence leading to proportional liability as a contradic-
tion to my contention that liability is a categorical ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question, and cannot reflect proportionality. In 
my view, proportional liability is a misnomer. When the contributory negligence principle applies, the extent of 
liability is proportioned, not the fact of liability. Even when contributory negligence applies, a plaintiff must 
establish that a defendant is legally liable to the plaintiff by demonstrating a duty of care, a breach of the 
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not and cannot be used at the liability stage. But the driving principles of the damages 
assessment stage demand that chances are, can, and must be substantively relevant to 
determine a plaintiff’s compensatory entitlements. In other words, simple probability 
reasoning lives here, as I substantiate next. 
PART 3: CHANCES AND SIMPLE PROBABILITY AT THE DAMAGES STAGE 
Once liability is established, the adjudicative inquiry shifts to determining damages. 
Unlike the liability analysis, which is driven by the defendant’s responsibility, the  
damages stage focuses on rectifying the plaintiff’s deprivation.69 I argue that the com-
pensatory principle dictates that a plaintiff’s damages entitlement will depend on the 
existence of chances. Relevant chances must bear an impact on the quantification of the 
plaintiff’s damages entitlements. The valuation of those chances occurs through simple 
probability reasoning: the value of the chance is equal to the total value of the outcome 
associated with the chance, multiplied by the likelihood of the outcome occurring.  
The improper characterization of simple probability has caused much confusion. I 
point to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Athey v Leonati70 and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Beldycki Estate v Jaiparagas71 to illustrate this confusion. 
Finally, I suggest a new approach to the availability of simple probability reasoning in 
damages assessments, which may help to avoid erroneous compensation awards. 
The Damages Assessment Stage: General  
The following quotation summarizes the foundational principles that have driven 
damages assessment since the House of Lords articulated them in the 1880 decision of 
Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co: 
I do not think that there is any difference of opinion as to its being the gen-
eral rule that, where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling 
the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly 
as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been 
injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if 
he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting compensation or 
reparation.72 
                                                                                                                                            
 
standard of care, and injury and causation. Only if these elements are established can the defendant be held 
responsible to the plaintiff at all. How much the defendant owes is a subsequent inquiry. Proportionality 
based on contributory negligence bears its impact at the latter inquiry. When applicable, the ‘how much’ 
question will be proportional to the defendant’s contribution, but this is a distinct inquiry from whether there 
is liability at all.  
69 Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra note 29 at 4-5. 
70 Athey, supra note 4. 
71 Beldycki Estate v Jaiparagas, 2012 ONCA 537, 295 OAC 100 [Beldycki]. 
72 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880), 5 App Cas 25 at 39 (HL). Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders, supra note 
29 cite this quotation as containing the foundational principle of damages assessment at 109. 
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This statement provides the backdrop for determining damages entitlements: once 
liability is established, the plaintiff is entitled to be fully compensated or to be restored 
to her injury-free condition. This is known as the restitutio in integrum principle.73  
The compensable loss can be conceptualized as ‘what has happened and will hap-
pen in the plaintiff’s life now that the tortious injury has occurred’ compared to ‘what 
would have happened in the plaintiff’s life, even if the injury had not occurred.’ Stated 
in a different way, to evaluate the plaintiff’s compensable loss the court must consider 
the difference between the plaintiff’s “original position” and “injured position.”74 In 
that effort, the Court must make findings of fact to establish what events have and will 
occur as a result of the injury (relevant to determining “injured position”), and what 
would have occurred if the injury had not occurred (relevant to “original position”).75 Of 
course, to define the compensable loss, the plaintiff must establish that the difference 
between her original and injured positions is a result of the negligent act. For instance, if 
a defendant’s tortious conduct causes a discrete neck injury, and the plaintiff subse-
quently breaks her leg, the leg injury is part of her post-injury condition, but it is clearly 
not part of ‘injured position’ relevant to defining her compensable loss.76 
Once the plaintiff has established that the harms she claims are properly compen-
sable, she bears the additional onus of proving the monetary losses she suffered arising 
from those harms. These losses include non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages. Non-
pecuniary damages are dollar amounts awarded to compensate the plaintiff’s pain and 
suffering. Pecuniary losses can be divided into pre-trial losses (sometimes called ‘special 
damages’) and future losses. Pre-trial pecuniary losses can be placed into two broad 
categories: cost of care and loss of working capacity. Pre-trial cost of care includes med-
ical expenses related to the injury and any compensable harms arising from it. The loss 
of working capacity includes lost earnings, lost profits and loss of home making capaci-
ty. A plaintiff may additionally claim for future cost of care and prospective loss of 
earnings.77 
Based on the above, the damages stage can be seen as a two-phase project. Phase 
One establishes legal facts to help determine what is compensable by defining the origi-
nal position versus the injured position. Phase Two concerns the valuation, or 
quantification of these losses. Suppose that a plaintiff establishes liability for the knee 
injury suffered in a car accident. At the damages stage, the plaintiff alleges that she 
developed arthritis in her knee and that she might need a knee surgery in the future. She 
                                                                                                                                            
73 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 31 at 11: the “normal measure of recovery in tort law is restitutio in in-
tegrum: the plaintiff is entitled to be restored to the position she would have been in had the tort never been 
committed.” For a judicial example, see Milana v Cartsch (1985), 49 BCLR (2d) 33 at 78, 30 ACWS (2d) 257, 
aff’d (1987), 49 BCLR (2d) 99 (BCCA): “The fundamental governing precept is restitutio in integrum. The 
injured person is to be restored to the position he would have been in had the accident not occurred, insofar 
as this can be done with money.” 
74 Athey, supra note 4 at para 32. 
75 This is explained in Cooper, supra note 32. 
76 Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra note 29 at 7: “The concepts of ‘compensation’ or ‘loss’ for the 
purpose of a civil action for damages are not synonymous with their general usage, where the term ‘loss’ may 
describe a ‘detriment’ unconnected with any wrongful conduct…However, for the purposes of civil actions 
for damages, the term ‘loss’ and therefore the concept of compensation, is causally tied to the wrongful event 
which produced the detrimental effects…” 
77 Ibid, see generally chapter 4, Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 31 at 119-159 for more detailed account of 
special damages. See also Christopher Bruce, Assessment of Personal Injury Damages, 4th ed (Markham, Ontario: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2004) for a useful guide for demonstrating pecuniary losses. 
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seeks compensation for both. The court must determine whether the plaintiff is suffer-
ing from arthritis, whether the arthritis is attributable to the injury, and whether there is 
a chance of a future knee surgery owing to the injury. These factual findings occur in 
Phase One of the damages stage. Then, in Phase Two, the court considers the valuation 
of these losses. There, questions to be asked include: what medical expenses did the 
plaintiff have in relation to the arthritis? What were her lost earnings due to the arthri-
tis? What costs will she incur in case of future surgery? How will her earning capacity be 
affected in case of the future surgery?  
Based on established doctrines routinely applied in the damages stage, I argue that 
chances are relevant to the factual inquiry of Phase One. These doctrines are justified 
on the basis that they enable proper application of the compensation principle. The 
relevance of chances, however, is sometimes hidden in the language of these various 
doctrines that may suppress an understanding that chances are being taken into account. 
Future Harms, Contingencies, Pre-existing Conditions/Crumbling Skulls  
Future Harms 
The routine compensation of future harms is the first indication that chances are 
relevant to damages assessments, and that their relevance ensures proper compensation. 
When a plaintiff claims for a possible future harm, she is not required to prove, on a 
balance of probabilities, that the future harm will occur, on a balance of probabilities. 
Rather, the plaintiff’s compensation will reflect the chance of the future harm occur-
ring.78  
Probabilistic compensation of future harms is often erroneously described as en-
gaging a different standard of proof for future facts, as explained in Part 1 of this paper. 
The better interpretation is that when future harms are compensated, the plaintiff must 
show there is a chance of a future harm. The existence of this chance, proven Phase in 
One, is relevant to the plaintiff’s ‘injured position.’ In Phase Two, the chance is quanti-
fied, and the damages award will reflect the likelihood of occurrence of the future harm, 
in accordance with simple probability valuation. 
In practice, the evidence relevant to the quantification of the chance (Phase Two) will 
also establish the existence of a chance (Phase One). Therefore, in many cases, the inquiry 
into the existence of a chance may be silent because it is presupposed. Nonetheless, this 
silent analysis underlies the quantification of the chance because, without establishing a 
relevant fact, there is nothing to quantify. Despite the potential silence, proof of a 
chance’s existence on a balance of probabilities must be kept in mind. It is impossible to 
determine when simple probability should apply without understanding what is happen-
ing when it is being used—chance has become a relevant legal fact. 
                                                                                                                                            
78 See for example Peter Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Butterworths 
Canada, 1993) at 109-110: “With certain types of injury there is always a risk of complications in the future, 
e.g. epilepsy is almost always a risk in brain damage cases, and arthritis is a common risk wherever bones are 
severely fractured…this means that the judge must calculate what sum would be appropriate if the risk mate-
rialized, and then award a fraction of this sum proportional to the risk occurring.” 
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Accounting for Contingencies 
The second instance of chances being relevant to damages awards is in the form of 
contingency deductions for future cost of care and loss of income. McLachlin J. en-
dorsed contingency deductions in Milina v Bartsh as follows: 
In recognition of the fact that the future cannot be foretold, allowance must 
be made for the contingency that the assumptions on which the award for 
pecuniary loss is predicated may prove inaccurate. In most cases this will re-
sult in a deduction, since the earnings and cost of care figures are based on 
an uninterrupted stream which does not reflect contingencies such as loss of 
employment, early death, or the necessity of institutional care.79 
These deductions, as McLachlin J. implies, are intended to account for the chance 
that ordinary life events may diminish the cost of care required or cause income reduc-
tions even if the injury had not occurred. For instance, a plaintiff may have a better-
than-expected recovery, and therefore require less cost of care. Courts may account for 
this possibility by reducing the cost of care award by the percentage figure that repre-
sents the probability of a speedier recovery. Similarly, courts may reduce loss of earnings 
awards to account for the a chance that a plaintiff would have experienced a reduction 
in income for reasons other than the negligent act, like other illness, business failures, 
layoffs, etc.80  
Although somewhat controversial, contingency deductions are endorsed by the 
courts.81 In Lewis v Todd, for instance, Dickson J. states that, “in principle, there is no 
reason why a court should not recognize, and give effect to those contingencies, good 
or bad, which may be reasonably foreseen…the court must attempt to evaluate the 
probability of the occurrence of the stated contingency.”82 Along with endorsing the use 
of contingency deductions generally, Dickson J.’s comments suggest that accounting for 
contingencies is a manifestation of the principle that chances (i.e. contingencies) are 
relevant to determining a damages award. That contingency is quantified using simple 
probability.83  
                                                                                                                                            
79 Milina v Bartsch (1985), 49 BCLR (2d) 33 at para 79, 30 ACWS (2d) 257.  
80 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 31 at 125-126 and 143. See also SM Waddams, The Law of Damages, 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2012) at 3.94. For a more detailed discussion of contingency reductions for 
future loss of working capacity, see Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra note 29 at 375-394, and contin-
gency reductions for future cost of care, 449-455. 
81 Part of the controversy is that courts make deductions almost as a matter of course, without appropriate 
reliance on evidence. Indicating the impropriety of this, the Supreme Court of Canada in Thornton v School 
District No. 57 (Prince George) et al, [1978] 2 SCR 267 at 284, 83 DLR (3d) 480 commented that “the imposition 
of a contingency deduction is not mandatory, although it is sometimes treated almost as if it were to be 
imposed in every case as a matter of law. The deductions, if any, will depend upon the facts of the case…” As 
Cassels & Adjin-Tettey suggest in Remedies, supra note 31 at 143, despite these comments, courts seem to make 
contingency deductions almost automatically. The legitimacy of such deductions is questionable because 
adjudicative decisions should occur on the basis of evidence, as opposed to judicial inklings. 
82 Lewis v Todd, [1980] 2 SCR 694,115 DLR (3d) 257 at 271. 
83 Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra note 29 at 380, state that “the inclusion of contingencies is a 
manifestation of simple probability reasoning, since contingencies have regard to cumulated possibilities 
rather than probabilities, and are assessed on the degree of likelihood of their occurrence.” On its face, I 
agree. But I adopt a different characterization of what “simple probability reasoning” means and implies 
compared to Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders. This difference is reflected in the slightly different phrasing 
that I have used in the text above. 
Vol. 23 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 215 
 
Translated into the language of ‘original position’ versus ‘injured position,’ making 
a contingency deduction reflects the court’s acceptance that there is a chance the plain-
tiff will endure some loss of income, or will require more or less medical expense. In 
order to ensure proper compensation, the defendant must return the plaintiff back to 
the original position, which includes the chance of detriment or windfall.  
Pre-Existing Injuries/Crumbling Skulls 
Accounting for pre-existing injuries is another example of the relevance of chances 
in assessing damages. Sometimes referred to as an application the ‘crumbling skull,’ 
accounting for pre-existing injuries ensures that the plaintiff is to be returned to the 
position he was in prior to the negligence, “with all of its attendant risks and shortcom-
ings, and not a better position.”84 In light of this principle, the Court provides that, “if 
there is a measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally af-
fected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, then this can 
be taken into account in reducing the overall award.”85  
The way that pre-existing conditions are accounted for is similar to contingency 
deductions. In the same way as ordinary life events create a chance of harm inherent to 
a plaintiff’s original position, so too do pre-existing conditions. When determining 
damages entitlements, courts must consider the chance that owing to a pre-existing injury 
or conditions, the plaintiff would have experienced the same losses that she now claims. 
Pre-existing chances may cause a plaintiffs’ award to be reduced through simple probabil-
ity reasoning by the value of the chance of the harm created by the pre-existing injury.  
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff claims for losses arising out of depression 
suffered after a tortious head injury. The trial judge finds the depression is related to the 
head injury, so it is part of the plaintiff’s ‘injured position.’ What if there is also evidence 
that the plaintiff suffered from psychological illness prior to the injury? The defendant 
can argue that the pre-existing psychological illness created a chance that the plaintiff 
would have become depressed, irrespective of the negligence. If the defendant can 
prove that the inherent psychological illness gave rise to a chance of depression, then 
that chance is a legitimate part of the plaintiff’s ‘injured position.’ If so, the award for 
the losses related to the depression can be offset by the value of the pre-existing chance 
of depression owing to the pre-existing psychological illness. Accounting for pre-
existing conditions is another manifestation of the principle that chances must be con-
sidered when determining the compensation entitlement.  
Accounting for pre-existing conditions, however, can easily become confused with 
proving two different causal connections.86 First, when assessing damages, if a court 
                                                                                                                                            
84 Ibid at 35. 
85 Ibid at 35. 
86 See, for example, Hosak v Hirst, 2003 BCCA 42, 177 BCAC 30, where the BC Court of Appeal expressly 
noted that the trial judge made the error of conflating the legal analysis for causation and pre-existing injuries. 
At para 10, the BC Court of Appeal noted: “…that the learned trial judge…erred in law by conflating the 
issue of causation (whether the accident caused the pre-existing condition to be ‘activated or aggravated’) with 
an issue relevant to the assessment of damages (whether there was a measurable risk that the pre-existing 
condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the respondent’s negli-
gence). In other words, it is my respectful view that…the trial judge erred in law by not distinguishing 
between the principles of law that had to be applied in determining the issue of causation and those that apply 
to the assessment of damages.” 
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finds that a particular harm is causally connected to the injury (for instance, the court 
found a causal relation between the negligently inflicted head injury and the depression 
in the example above), then it may seem self-contradictory to also account for a pre-
existing condition that may have caused the same harm (e.g. the depression).  
Second, if liability is established, that means that a causal link between the defend-
ant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury has been established in law. To then take into 
account a pre-existing condition that may have resulted in the same injury can also seem 
self-contradictory. That perception would allow for incorrect compensation of a plain-
tiff on the presumption that the chance of harm arising from a pre-existing condition 
cannot be relevant, because the causal link between the defendant’s negligence and the 
harm suffered has become a legal certainty.  
The first problem arose in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Athey. The  
second problem is demonstrable in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Beldycki decision. I 
argue that an erroneous conception of simple probability reasoning and its application 
to pre-existing injuries is a critical reason for the errors in compensation that occurred 
in both decisions.  
Athey 
Athey brought a suit for recovery of damages for injuries sustained after two acci-
dents. At trial, the accidents were treated as one and the defendants each admitted 
liability. Six months later, during an exercise warm up, Athey suffered a disc herniation 
that required surgery. At trial, Boyd J. found that the injuries from the accident were a 
25% causal factor of the herniation. She awarded 25% of the total assessed award for 
the disc herniation.87 Athey appealed, arguing that he should have been awarded 100% 
of the damages arising from the disc herniation. Southin J.A. of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal declined to consider the argument, and dismissed the appeal.88 The 
case was appealed further, and the Supreme Court considered whether the trial judge’s 
approach provided Athey with proper compensation.  
The Supreme Court overturned the trial judge’s 75% reduction. According to Jus-
tice Major, “The only issue was whether the disc herniation was caused by the injuries 
sustained in the accidents or whether it was attributable to the appellant’s pre-existing 
back problems.”89 The Court held that since it was established that the herniation was 
caused by the injuries arising from the accidents, causation was a legal certainty. There-
fore, there could be no legal finding that suggested that a pre-existing condition, as 
opposed to the tortious conduct, could have been behind Athey’s disc herniation. On 
that basis, Athey was compensated for all the losses that arose out of the herniation 
without accounting for his pre-existing condition.90  
The Supreme Court considered a number of arguments for reducing Athey’s dam-
ages award, given his predisposition to back injury, including the ‘crumbling skull’ and 
‘adjustments for contingencies’ arguments. The Court acknowledged that the crumbling 
skull argument was the defendants’ “strongest submission.” The crumbling skull princi-
ple “recognizes that the pre-existing condition was inherent in the plaintiff’s original 
                                                                                                                                            
87 Athey v Leonati (1993), 44 ACWS (3d) 908, [1993] BCJ No 2777 (QL). 
88 Athey, supra note 4 at para 10. 
89 Ibid at para 7. 
90 Ibid at para 41. 
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position,” and “the defendant need not put the plaintiff in a better position than his or 
her original position.” Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the findings of fact made 
by the trial judge did not imply an obligation to reduce Athey’s award to account for the 
pre-existing susceptibility to disc herniation.91 
Responding to the defendants’ argument that the trial judge’s approach could be 
considered a routine contingency reduction, the Supreme Court pointed to the distinc-
tion between, on the one hand, past facts, and on the other hand, future and 
hypothetical facts. While future and hypothetical facts can be accommodated through 
simple probability reasoning, the Court agreed that past facts must be proven on a bal-
ance of probabilities. Past facts would therefore be subject to ‘all-or-nothing’ treatment. 
The Court characterized the causal link between the injuries and the disc herniation as a 
past fact. Therefore, the contingency principle, which implies probabilistic reasoning, 
was not applicable. Instead, the causal link was to be proven on a balance of probabili-
ties, and thereafter, treated as a legal certainty.92 Since the trial judge had found that this 
causal link was established on a balance of probabilities, no pre-existing condition that 
rendered Athey susceptible to disc herniation was taken into account. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning suggests that taking into account the pre-existing 
chance that Athey would have suffered the disc herniation somehow negates or com-
promises the usual process of proving a causal connection in law. However, proof of 
the causal link between the tortious injuries and herniation is not at issue. Properly 
understood, the question in Athey is “whether it was proper to take into consideration 
the pre-existing chance that Athey may have suffered the herniation absent any negli-
gence.” The fact that the causal relation between the tortious injury and the disc 
herniation is established provides that Athey’s disc herniation will form a legitimate part 
of his ‘injured position.’ This does not preclude the relevance of the pre-existing chance 
of disc herniation in Athey’s ‘original position.’ The causal question that was relevant to 
defining Athey’s ‘injured position’ is not re-opened when defining his ‘original position.’ 
Undoubtedly, harms claimed as part of the ‘injured position’ must be causally con-
nected to the tortious injury. For instance, a coincidental broken leg between the time of 
the accident and his trial would not be relevant to a plaintiff’s ‘injured position’ because 
it would not have been caused by the tortious injuries. Accordingly, when Major J. states 
that the issue at stake is whether the disc herniation was caused by the tortious injuries, 
and that this causal connection must be proven on a balance of probabilities, he is only 
partially correct, and the implication that he draws from the causal connection being 
established is not correct.  
Athey is correct to the extent that the causal connection between the tortious injury 
and the herniation must be established, on a balance of probabilities, for the disc herni-
ation to be relevant to Athey’s ‘injured position.’ However, once the causal connection 
was established, holding that the pre-existing chance of disc herniation was rendered 
irrelevant circumvented half of the requisite inquiry for the damages determination. 
Deeming the pre-existing chance of disc herniation irrelevant meant that the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                                            
91 Ibid at para 35. As Dennis Klimchuk and Vaughan Black maintain in “A Comment on Athey v Leonati: 
Causation, Damages and Thin Skulls” (1997) 31 UBCL Rev 163, a better approach may have been to send the 
matter back to the trial judge to make appropriate findings with respect to Athey’s pre-existing susceptibility 
to disc herniation, which may have led to a deduction of the damages award. 
92 Athey, supra note 4 at paras 26-30. 
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‘original position’ was defined as significantly more valuable than it actually was because 
it ignored Athey’s pre-negligence back condition.  
The source of this error can be traced to the misconception that surrounds simple 
probability reasoning. By contrasting past facts versus future/hypothetical facts, and 
suggesting that a different standard of proof applies to different types of facts,93 the 
Court displayed its misguided interpretation of simple probability. Misunderstanding 
simple probability as a method of proof, the Court thought that the requirement to 
prove causation on a balance of probabilities would be compromised if simple probabil-
ity was applied to account for Athey’s pre-existing chance of back problems. The failure 
to recognize that the pre-existing chance of harm can itself be a legal fact caused the 
Court to wrongly apply the compensation principle, resulting in an erroneous damages 
award. The Court subsumed the question of determining Athey’s compensable loss 
within the question of defining Athey’s injured position (which required establishing a 
causal link between the tortious injury and the disc herniation). However, it is the differ-
ence between the original position and the injured position that truly constitutes the 
plaintiff’s compensable loss. The Supreme Court, however, did not define the plaintiff’s 
original position at all, at least not in reference to the disc herniation.  
Beldycki Estate v Jaiparagas 
The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Beldycki Estate v Jaiparagas94 shows 
how easily proof of causation principles in liability determination can improperly creep 
into the question of whether pre-existing chances are relevant for damages assessments. 
There, the plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a malignant tumour from his colon. 
After the surgery, a radiologist failed to notice a liver lesion on his CT scan. No post-
operative treatment was scheduled. Two years later, a medical examination revealed 
Stage IV colon cancer, giving Mr. Beldycki just 4–6 months to live without treatment or 
20 months to live with treatment. The plaintiff died 4 months after the jury returned its 
verdict. 
The jury found that the radiologist was negligent in misreading the CT scan, and 
that caused the plaintiff to be “not disease free” when the case was tried. Liability was 
therefore established, and damages were awarded.95 The radiologist did not contest his 
negligence. But he appealed the jury’s decision on two relevant grounds: 
1. The jury’s finding of causation was erroneous because the evidence could 
not establish on a balance of probabilities that ‘but for’ his negligence, the 
plaintiff would have been disease free at the time of trial. 
 
2. The jury improperly failed to reduce the loss of future income award on 
the basis of the chance that the loss could have occurred anyway even if 
the negligence had not occurred. 
                                                                                                                                            
93 Ibid at para 27: “Hypothetical events (such as how the plaintiff’s life would have proceeded without the 
tortious injury) or future events need not be proven on a balance of probabilities. Instead, they are simply 
given weight according to their relative likelihood…by contrast, past events must be proven, and once proven 
they are treated as certainties.” 
94 Beldycki, supra note 71. 
95 Ibid at para 3. 
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The defendant’s appeal was dismissed. Answering the first ground of appeal, Jus-
tice Watt stated that “an action for delayed medical diagnosis and treatment, a plaintiff 
must establish on a balance of probabilities that the delay caused or contributed to the 
unfavourable outcome.”96 Given the evidence that the plaintiff’s chance of cure was 
greater than 50% before the misdiagnosis, it was open to the jury to conclude that the 
balance of probabilities test for causation was satisfied, and the radiologist could be 
found liable. This seems accurate.  
Watt J.’s subsequent comments about the award for future income loss, however, 
mixed causation-for-liability principles and damages principles. Appealing for a reduc-
tion in the future loss of income award, the radiologist argued that the jury failed to 
account for adverse contingencies.97 He argued that the jury should have reduced the 
award by 30% to account for the hypothetical chance that even with proper treatment, 
it was possible that the same losses would have occurred anyway. The plaintiff respond-
ed that since the jury had found the doctor’s negligence to be the legal cause of the 
injury, he was liable for the full extent of the losses.  
Like the Supreme Court in Athey, Justice Watt referred to the principle that past 
facts are to be proven on a balance of probabilities, and are thereafter treated as legal 
certainties.98 On this basis, he found the defendant doctor’s argument flawed because 
once it is established that the doctor’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury, that fact is 
taken as legal certainty, and full compensatory damages are awarded. According to Jus-
tice Watt, no principle allows the defendant to discount the full measure of the damages 
to reflect the chance that the same losses would have occurred even absent the negli-
gence.99 This also ignores the compensation principle, which requires that the plaintiff 
be returned to his original position, but not beyond.  
In Beldycki, the plaintiff’s original position included a quantifiable likelihood that he 
may not have been cured even if the doctor’s negligence had not occurred. Justice 
Watt’s finding that “at law, that [the plaintiff] would have been cured was therefore a 
certainty; that his cancer might still have metastasized was a legal impossibility.”100 On 
that account, Justice Watt’s refusal to consider chance in the damages assessment con-
stitutes an error in the application of the compensation principle. It is true that 
causation was determined for the purpose of establishing liability, and when liability is 
established (and assuming no contributory negligence) a defendant is 100% liable to 
return the plaintiff to his pre-accident condition. This pre-accident condition must be deter-
mined, and this is part of the task of the damages stage. A finding of causation does not 
exclude the chance that the plaintiff would have suffered some earlier harm that over-
laps with the harm now being claimed as part of his ‘injured position.’ The two are not 
mutually exclusive, and characterizing them as such results in inaccurate compensation. 
As in Athey, the Beldycki error can be traced back, at least in part, to a problematic 
understanding of simple probability reasoning. Both courts point to the past/future 
divide as determining when simple probability reasoning is available. This prevents 
chances from being seen as relevant legal facts. Suggesting that simple probability is not 
available for past facts, but is only available for future (and sometimes for hypothetical) 
                                                                                                                                            
96 Ibid at para 44. 
97 Ibid at para 63. 
98 Ibid at para 73. 
99 Ibid at para 84. 
100 Ibid at para 84. 
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facts results in a confusion between the principles that must be applied to establish 
liability and those applicable to assessing damages. 
At the liability stage, if causation was established on a balance of probabilities, any 
chance that an injury was caused by some other factor is no longer relevant. Once a 
legal fact is proven on the requisite standard, it is thereafter treated as ‘established’ in 
law in accordance with the all-or-nothing method of fact-finding. But misinterpreting 
simple probability as a standard of proof can mask the fact that this method of fact-
finding holds true in the damages stage as well. The valuation of harms is dependent on 
an underlying fact-finding process whereby the plaintiff’s original and injured positions 
are defined. These facts are subject to proof on a balance of probabilities, just like facts 
at the liability stage. 
The difference, however, is that at the liability stage, there is an ‘all or nothing’ ap-
proach—either there is liability, or there is not.101 In this way, liability inquiry parallels 
fact-finding—if there is only one legal fact at issue (i.e. did the negligence cause the 
inquiry), then the answer to this legal question, which is to be proven on the balance of 
probabilities, will be determinative of the liability question as well. Accordingly, any 
chance that the injury was caused by some other factor becomes wholly irrelevant to the 
liability determination—once the causal link between the negligence and the injury is 
established, the defendant is liable. 
In contrast, the damages stage does not culminate in an all-or-nothing outcome. It 
determines a dollar figure that represents the extent of the defendant’s liability. Legal 
facts, including the causal connection between the injury and harm, are found on the 
basis of the balance of probabilities and all-or-nothing approach in the damages assess-
ment stage. For example, the causal link between Athey’s disc herniation and the 
tortious injury had to be proven on a balance of probabilities. If the balance of probabil-
ities is met, the disc herniation becomes part of the Athey’s injured position. If the 
balance of probabilities is not met, the disc herniation cannot be part of the injured 
position at all. However, at the damages stage, there is no reason for this to preclude the 
relevance of a pre-existing chance of suffering the same harm. Rather, the compensa-
tion principle requires that pre-existing chance to be accounted for within the plaintiff’s 
original position. 
Joseph King explains this divide in his discussion of the relationship between pre-
existing injuries and the “thin skull” principle. The thin skull rule provides that a plain-
tiff should not be prevented from establishing liability because his pre-existing 
susceptibilities (his ‘thin skill’) caused the tortious harm suffered to be extreme.102 How-
ever, this does not mean that the pre-existing condition that caused the extreme 
consequences must be ignored when assessing a plaintiff’s damages.103 As King explains 
it, “[T]hat a terminally ill victim would have died on Tuesday, the next day, does not 
                                                                                                                                            
101 See Part 2, Section 3: The Impossibility of Simple Probability in the Liability Context, above. 
102 For example, see John Munkman, Damages for Personal Injury and Death, 9th ed (London: Butterworths, 1993) 
at 39: “Where a plaintiff has some pre-existing weakness which renders him more liable to injury than other 
persons—such as a thin skull or a tendency to bleed—the defendant is liable for such injuries (assuming he is 
liable at all) although their extent could not be foreseen.” 
103 King, supra note 55 at 1361. See also Cooper-Stephenson and Saunders, supra note 29 at 851: “The defend-
ant may be able to show that the plaintiff’s condition, although it became worse than might normally be 
expected, would have deteriorated anyway: that is a ‘crumbling skull’ case. Thus, a plaintiff’s unusual suscepti-
bility will not go unnoticed when the issue of quantum is reached.” 
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prevent the defendant’s conduct from being a cause of his death on Monday, but would 
obviously be quite relevant to the question of damages.”104  
If pre-existing conditions are to be taken into account for damages assessment, 
then the only logical approach is that they are relevant through the chance of harm that 
they engender. Otherwise, for a pre-existing condition to be relevant the causal connec-
tion between the pre-existing condition and the harm that it is alleged to have caused 
would have to be established on a balance of probabilities. That is, the pre-existing 
condition would have to be shown to be the cause of the harm itself (not just the 
chance of harm) in order to gain any relevance. If this were the approach to accounting 
for pre-existing conditions, then the Courts’ misgivings about negation of the causal 
analysis either at the liability stage or when defining a plaintiff’s ‘injured position’ would 
have merit. This approach would render it impossible for pre-existing conditions to bear 
any relevance to damages assessment without negating a causal relationship between 
either negligence and injury (Beldycki) or injury and harm (Athey). This leaves only two 
options: abandon the requirement to consider pre-existing injuries when considering a 
plaintiff’s damages entitlements, or make them relevant in terms of the chances of harm 
they create. The first option is undesirable. Pre-existing conditions must be relevant to 
damages assessments in order to ensure that defendants are not held accountable and 
then end up improving the plaintiff’s original position.  
A pre-existing condition is relevant to the plaintiff’s original position to the extent 
that it disposed the plaintiff to a chance of harm, prior to his being subjected to any 
tortious conduct. That chance is the relevant legal fact. The existence of the chance 
must be proven on the balance of probabilities, just like any other legal fact. Once a pre-
existing chance of harm is established, this chance becomes part of the plaintiff’s ‘origi-
nal position.’ This chance gains relevance in the quantification of the plaintiff’s damages 
through simple probability reasoning. The total award for the relevant harm will be 
reduced by the percentage value of the chance. 
Summary 
The damages principles discussed above all aim to ensure proper compensation, 
and all necessitate the use of simple probability reasoning. Understanding simple proba-
bility as a method of making a chance a relevant fact in its own right better accords with 
the principle that a plaintiff’s damages should be full and accurate. By contrast, if simple 
probability were taken to be a method of proving future facts, then the compensation 
that would result would be invariably inaccurate. Consider a claim for a future surgery 
that has a 30% likelihood of being needed. Simple probability reasoning will provide 
30% of the entire assessed value of the surgery to the plaintiff. Some time later, the 
surgery will either occur or not. In respect of the future event itself, the plaintiff will 
have been either over- or under-compensated—over-compensated if the surgery does 
not occur, under-compensated if the surgery does occur. The ‘chance as a legal fact’ 
interpretation avoids this inevitability of inaccuracy because that approach does not 
purport to ‘prove’ the uncertain outcome, but to quantify its chance or risk. 
For example, when a plaintiff claims that a risk of future harm is part of her ‘in-
jured position,’ she must establish the existence of this chance, and its causal connection 
                                                                                                                                            
104 King, supra note 55 at 1361. 
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to her tortious injuries, on a balance of probabilities. Similarly, if a defendant alleges that 
a plaintiff’s award should be reduced to account for a chance of harm created by a pre-
existing injury, he must prove on a balance of probabilities that such a chance of harm 
existed in the plaintiff’s original position. The existence of these chances is proven in 
Phase One of the damages stage, where the facts that define the plaintiff’s original posi-
tion and injured position are established. If a plaintiff proves, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the tortious injuries created a chance for future surgery, this chance 
will be relevant to the plaintiff’s “injured position.” If a defendant proves, on a balance 
of probabilities, that a pre-existing condition also caused a chance of future surgery, 
then this chance will be part of the “original position.” 
If a chance of surgery is relevant to the injured position, or to both the original  
position and the injured position, then the value of these chances is quantified through 
the simple probability metric. For instance, consider a scenario where the tortious injury 
caused a 60% chance of future surgery and the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition caused a 
20% chance of the same surgery. Comparing the injured position to the original posi-
tion, the plaintiff’s compensable loss is a 40% chance of surgery. In accordance with 
simple probability reasoning, therefore, he should be awarded 40% of the total value of 
the surgery. Now suppose that a causal connection could not be established between 
the pre-existing condition and the chance of surgery. That means that the chance of a 
surgery is not part of the plaintiff’s original position. In that case, the plaintiff is entitled 
to 60% of the cost of the future surgery.  
CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF A NEW APPROACH TO SIMPLE PROBABILITY 
The foundation of this paper is the argument that simple probability is mischarac-
terized as a standard of proof. It is better understood as a method of recognizing the 
value of a chance in its own right. This interpretation implies that when simple probabil-
ity is used, a two-stage analysis takes place. First, the existence of a chance is proven on 
the balance of probabilities standard, so the chance itself becomes a legally relevant fact. 
Then, simple probability is used to quantify that chance. This is the ‘chance as a legal 
fact’ interpretation of simple probability. Not only is this interpretation more accurate, 
but it brings a number of constructive benefits.  
First, the ‘chance as a legal fact’ model permits the existence of a chance to have a 
legally cognizable value, irrespective of the eventual outcome. A chance or risk in its 
own right does bring value or detriment to a person’s life, so a principle that allows for 
that recognition in law is appreciable. In recognizing that value, the simple probability 
principle also mitigates any concern that it is unduly onerous to require a plaintiff to 
prove future or hypothetical events, which are naturally uncertain, because these events 
are not subject to legal proof at all. Simple probability reasoning provides an avenue to 
recognize the value of a potential future harm or a hypothetical occurrence, but does 
not require proof of the uncertain future or counter-factual event itself.  
By expressly recognizing the value of a chance, the new interpretation of simple 
probability reasoning better ensures that chances and risks are taken into account when 
the legal determination at stake requires it. Parts 2 and 3 demonstrated how the misun-
derstanding of simple probability can result in erroneously considering chances to be 
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substantively relevant at the liability stage, or can result in failing to recognize their 
relevance at the damages stage. Understanding simple probability as a chance-valuation 
tool can circumvent such errors. 
Another benefit is that the ‘chance as a legal fact’ interpretation preserves the con-
sistency with which the adjudicative system accommodates factual uncertainties. The 
balance of probabilities and all-or-nothing approach to fact-finding is the legal system’s 
technique of converting factual uncertainty into legal certainty. Because it allows for 
legal facts to be proven to a standard that is less than certainty, the balance of probabili-
ties and all-or-nothing approach contains the inherent risk that legal facts are factually 
inaccurate. Still, adjudicative decisions are made on the basis of those legal facts. The 
legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes is nonetheless maintained because the factual un-
certainty is managed consistently: all litigants are equally subject to the balance of 
probabilities and all-or-nothing method.  
The consistent application of the balance of proof and all-or-nothing approach is 
compromised when simple probability reasoning is interpreted as an alternative proof 
mechanism. The ‘chance as a legal fact’ interpretation avoids the alleged abandonment 
of conventional procedure for translating factual uncertainties into certain legal facts. 
Given that adjudicative legitimacy is contingent on factual uncertainty being accommo-
dated consistently among litigants, a significant benefit of the ‘chance as a legal fact’ 
interpretation is that it upholds this consistency.  
Finally, and most fundamentally, the ‘chance as a legal fact’ interpretation forces an 
approach to the application of simple probability that is grounded on the substantive 
demands of liability determinations and damages assessments. As a way to give legal 
relevance to a chance, simple probability reasoning must only be applicable where 
chances themselves are relevant to the legal determination at stake. Determining when 
chances are and are not relevant facts depends on the unique requirements of both the 
liability and damages determinations. Accordingly, the availability of simple probability 
could not clash with the demands of either liability or damages determinations, as inevi-
tably occurs under the ‘type of fact’ approach, because its applicability is grounded on 
those very demands.  
The ‘chance as a legal fact’ interpretation gives rise to an approach that can be  
employed more coherently than the current ‘type of fact’ frameworks. Simple probabil-
ity reasoning should be used where chances are substantively relevant. I conclude that 
simple probability has no utility in liability determinations because chances are not rele-
vant at that stage, but it is applicable in assessing damages to ensure that all the relevant 
chances, past or future, are taken into account. 
